Rob Crowne

COLLEGE TOURNAMENT HANDICAPPING

Rob Crowne — Sat, 13 Mar 2010 20:00:00 GMT

College Tournament Handicapping
© Rob Crowne & Assoc., March 12, 2010

Successfully handicapping the NCAA Conference Playoffs and the NCAA Tournament requires an awareness of the special factors the game location presents. The supposedly neutral sites are not necessarily neutral.

To analyze any advantage that may lie in the location of the game, you must fully understand the factors that create a home court advantage. What is generally referred to as the home court edge is actually comprised of two equal parts - the advantage to the home team of being home, and the disadvantage to the road team of playing on the road. Some of the home team edge may come from the physical court itself. In basketball, the dimensions of the arena, acoustics, sight lines, bounce in the floorboards, tightness of the baskets, and proximity of the crowd to the players, and amenities in the locker room can all play a part in providing an edge to the home team. The factors don't end with the physical court, however. Here are the home edge factors and road disadvantage factors that may come from the geographical location of the game, and will exist independent of the court on which the game is played.

HOME ADVANTAGE:

1 The crowd.

The effect of the crowd cannot be underestimated. The closer a game is to the campus of a team, the larger the fan base can be expected to be for that team. Teams playing a short drive from their campus will have a much larger contingent of fans than a team that traveled across the country for a game. It is a demonstrable fact that tournament teams playing in their home state have a higher tournament win-rate than teams from other states.

State lines, however, are not always a good indicator. In some cases, a game may be played sufficiently close to one team's campus to create a natural fan base even though the game is being played in a different state. For example, in the Atlantic 10 Conference, the 2009 Season Tournament is being played in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Even though Atlantic City is in a different State, Philadelphia, PA is so close that a large percentage of the hotel and casino workers in Atlantic City commute from residences in Philadelphia. Temple, located in Philadelphia, is likely to have a larger attendance of fans than a team that is playing in its home state, but on a court that is 400 miles from the campus.

2. Friends and Family

Having personal friends and family at the game can provide a great deal of incentive. The advantage of friends in the crowd is a function of the distance of the court from the campus, not the physical court itself.

3. Travel Time

Anybody who has ever taken a long trip by bus knows how uncomfortable and exhausting it is. After sitting in a bus or an airplane for hours your legs get cramped. When you arrive your legs feel wobbly. You are not ready to walk let alone play basketball. This problem is compounded by the fact that buses and planes are not designed for very tall people with very long legs. Basketball players spend hours with their legs in tight, uncomfortable quarters. When they stand, they cannot stand up straight without hitting their heads. A trip that is difficult and uncomfortable for an average size person, is four times worse for a basketball player.

On Saturday, March 13, 2010, Tennessee is playing in its home state. Nevertheless, it is a solid 3+ hour bus ride to Nashville, where the game is being played. Tennessee will either need to travel 3-4 hours on the day of the game, or stay in a hotel with all the disadvantages of any road team. Thus, the only advantage that the location will give to Tennessee over their semi-final opponent, Kentucky is that the crowd is more likely to root for a Tennessee team. Vanderbilt, on the other hand, will have every home advantage available at the Sommet Center. If Vanderbilt and Tennessee should happen to meet in the Championship Game, Vanderbilt should be considered the home team, and Tennessee should be considered the visitor. .

ROAD DISADVANTAGE:

Physical Effects of Travel

If you have ever experienced irregular bowel movements, excess fatigue, or insomnia during the first few days of a vacation trip, you understand the effect that sleeping I a different place, eating different food, and in some cases being in a different time zone can have on your body. Not sleeping in your bed, not eating your usual food, not eating on your normal schedule, and not sleeping and waking on your normal schedule all have negative effects on a road team.

2. Practice Schedules

The road team must share the available court time, locker space and meeting space with all the other road teams in the tournament. Scheduled practices may be inconvenient, or too short, and lockers may be crowded and uncomfortable. A player who wants extra practice time at the free throw line, may not be able to get it. Compare that to the situation for a team with a campus only a half hour away from the tournament site. They can practice in their usual campus gym at their usual times and for as long as they desire.

3. Distractions

Being away from home can create a number of distractions. In some locations, such as Las Vegas, Hawaii, or Miami, just walking to dinner can present distractions. Some teams lack the discipline to perform well in locations in which they would rather be taking spring break.

Of course, all the advantages of the home fans and short travel time enjoyed by the local team are equal and opposite disadvantages for teams that are attending from distant campuses.

Often the lines are set based on the public perception that the game is being played on a neutral court. Mapping distances between the campuses and the tournament arena, and adding or subtracting points for local advantages and disadvantages can provide a winning edge over the line in many games.

I discussed handicapping for a neutral court in a blog article last year entitled, "March Madness Statistical Handicapping."

ANSWERS TO YOUR TEASER QUESTIONS

Rob Crowne — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 08:20:00 GMT

Here are the answers to some of the questions asked in the Comments to my article, "Teaser of the Year? What's That?"

Question 1: posted by jonpistone2 on 12/07/2009 3:01 AM

i noticed u talked lots about 6 and 7 point teasers...clearly in a 13 point teasers you must get FOUR games right, rather than two...and ties are counted as a LOSS (which ive noticed makes these 12.5 point teasers if the line isnt already set at a half) ... but i was wondering if u had any thoughts on this and why i shouldnt be playing them.

I wrote only about 6 and 7 point teasers because they were the subject of the article, and if I tried to include everything about every type of teaser in one article the post would be too long for most people to want to read. Since you ask, I'll write about the 4-team sweetheart teasers here.

There is absolutely no reason that you shouldn't be playing 4-team, 13-point, sweetheart teasers laying odds of 12-10 or less, so long as you only bet them in the NFL, and you restrict yourself to only teasing teams with a half-point line and all four teams are teased only within the range of the favorite winning by 1.5 points and the favorite winning by 17.5 points. In practical betting terms, that means you can get an advantage teasing any underdog up from any half point line in the range of +1.5 to +4.5 to between +14.5 and +17.5, or you can tease any favorite with a half point in the range between -14.5 and -17.5 down to -1.5 to -4.5. If you stray from these requirements on any of your four underlyng bets you will be getting the worst of it.

The difficulty you will encounter is finding four teams on the schedule that fit the above qualifications. Most books offering the 4-team, 13-point sweetheart teasers with a lay of 12-10 are careful not to give four of those qualifying lines to you all at the same time. That's why you keep seeing lines like 2(-25) instead of 2.5.

In NCAA Football there is no sequence of 13 consecutive numbers that will give you a sufficient edge to overcome the huge vig on these teasers described below.

The biggest problem with 4-team sweetheart teasers is that you must win all 4 games. By betting only teams with half point lines, you eliminate the problem of all ties causing the teaer to lose, with no reduction of the number of teams for a push. If you flip a coin, the odds against winning 4 out of 4 selections are 15-1. You can work that out by diagraming all possible combinations of results for the 4 games. You will find there are 16 possible results, but only one of those combinations will win, to wit, the Win-Win-Win-Win combination. Since there are only two possble results for each game -- Win or Lose - you can also calculate the total number of possible combinations by simply multiplying 2 by itself 4 times. 2 x2 x2 x2 = 16. When only one comination out of 16 will win and 15 will lose the odds are 15 losses to 1 win, or 15-1 against winning.

If you put $120 through the window on four teams, the true odds breakeven payout would be 15 x $120 + return of your $120 original bet. That equals $1920. On the sweetheart teaser, the book only gives you back your original $120 bet plus $100, for a total of $220. The difference between $1920 you should get, and the $220 you actually get is pocketed by the bookmakers. That's one huge $1700 vig coming off the top of your win on a $100 bet..

The vig, however, does not necessarily mean the teaser is a bad bet. Let's pretend you bet 160 teasers. By flipping a coin you can expect to win 10 and lose 150. To be a winner at odds of -120, you will need to win 87 teasers in every 160, instead of just 10. The question is whether the 13 point line move will cause the needed 77 losing teasers to move over to the winning column so that you can eek out a tiny win.

To answer that question, you need to know how many times each of the score differentials you cross can be expected to appear as the final score in each of the games you bet. You can find various sources of Push Percentage Tables for the NFL and NCAA by doing a search. Use the average of several, since their results may vary depending on the time period studied. The study should be for a period of at least 10 years to be meaningful. I'd give you some links to push percentage tables on the net, but I'm not sure whether that would be considered a promotion for competing websites, so you will need to do own hunting.

Question 2: posted by SKing24 on 12/08/2009 2:34 PM
Not sure I understand you here...So, you are saying that teasing a 3.5 fave to a 3.5 dog is not smart b/c I am going thru 0? I essentially crossed over 2 key numbers by going thru 3 twice. Not only that, but I just made a team the oddsmakers feel is better than a FG than the other team a dog of more than 3. Am I missing something here?

Yup. You understood me correctly. Here's what you are missing:
I assume that you are laying 13-10 on your 7-point teaser. At odds of 13-10 you will need to win 56.5% of your teasers in order to just break even. You can check that by assuming you bet 100 teasers and win $100 on 56.5 of them for a total win of $5650, but lose $130 on 43.5 of them for a total loss of 5655. The $5 difference is due to rounding out decimals.

In order to win a 2-team teaser 56.5% of the time you must win the games in them at a rate of 75.2%. We calculate that by taking the square root of 56.5%. If you win each game 75.25% of the time, you will win both games (and thereby win your teaser) .752 x .752 times = .565. That converts to the required 56.5% teaser wins needed to break even.

Even though 3 is a key number, you are not doubling up the advantage by crossing the underdog winning by 3. When you have a favorite of 3.5 points, the favorite will win by 3 almost twice as often than the underdog will win by 3. Thus the you are not getting the advantage you believe you are getting by crossing the key number of 3 twice.

The numbers 1 and 2 are worth very little with the favorite winning, and even less with the underdog winning, because the underdog will win by 1 or 2 points fewer times than the favorite. As my article discussed, the Pick is completely worthless as a number. The final score of the game can be expected to fall between the favorite winning by 3 and the underdog winning by 3 approximately 21 times in 100 That means that in 100 games you will move approximately 21 games from the loss column to the win column by teasing a team from -3.5 to +3.5. To find a chart that will give the number of times a game will land on number on both sides of the pick'em line you need to search a chart of the occurrence of each number, not just a chart of push pecentages. A chart of push percentages will only give you the nnumber of times the favorite will win by each particluar line.

We calculate whether you are gaining or losing with a teaser by considering the increase in result if you flip a coin to pick your teams. If the line move turns the coin flip into the percentage you need to create a breakeven at odds of 13-10, then you have the edge. If not, then the bookmaker is taking the edge and you are getting the worst of it.

In this case if we add our increased 21 wins to a 50-50 coin flip, we get 71 wins. Since the line move is on the underlying games, it is the win percentage of the underlying games that is increased 21%. We calculated that we need 75.25% winners on the underlying games in order to break even in a 2-team teaser at odds of 13-10. The line move from -3.5 to +3.5 is only getting you a 71% win rate on the underlying games. That translates to .71 x .71 = 50.4% of our teasers won. We've already calculated that you need to win 56.5% of your teasers to breakeven at odds of 13-10. Winning 50.4% won't do it. The bookmaker is taking more advantage with the odds than he is giving you bakc with the line move.

Using a coin flip when straight betting would only get you 50% winners, but breakeven is a much lower 52.5%. That is because the bookmaker is taking much less commission. The difference between the teaser expectation of 50.4% and the teaser breakeven of 56.5% is more than twice the vig cost of straight betting. You will lose $1408 by flipping a coin and betting the games in the teaser you suggest 100 times for $130 each. You will lose only $500 per 100 games by flipping a coin and betting straight.
In case anyone is interested, you can expect to lose only $1300 by betting your two teams in 100 parlays for $130 each at odds of 13-5 in your favor. In other words, your teasers will cost a $100 bettor $908 more than making 100 straight bets to win $100, and $108 more than parlaying the same teams,. The extra cost exists whether or not the bettor's own handicapping percentage makes him a net winner in the end or a net loser in the end on his teasers. Compared to the parlay, he will either win $108 less or lose $108 more than playing the exact same teams in a parlay instead of your suggested 2-team parlay Parlays are bad bets, but your suggested 7-point teaser is worse. .

TEASER OF THE YEAR? WHAT'S THAT?

Rob Crowne — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 08:39:00 GMT

Last Saturday, a pay-after-you-win internet sports handicapper promoted a "Teaser of the Year." His recommended teaser was a 7-point beauty on Rutgers/Oregon.   Both teams were favored by 5.5 points, and were teased to +1 1/2. Rutgers took a bath, making the teaser a hideous loser at odds of 13-10 for most people.

As I thought about the selections and the promotion, I couldn't help but wonder what a "Teaser of the Year" might be. The easy answer is that a "Teaser of the Year" is the best teaser the handicapper will see all year. But what makes a teaser the best teaser?   Defining what constitutes the best teaser, or even a good teaser, is much harder than it seems.

A Game of the Year is simply the best bet a handicapper expects to see all year. It is a game that handicaps with a high probability of covering the spread. When a single proposition, bet straight, has a high probability of winning compared to the line, it is automatically the best bet to make. The same is not true of teasers.

For the purposes of this discussion, we will ignore the fact that teasers are bad bets in general. We will make the assumption that a "Teaser of the Year" is the best building one expects to find in a slum. The problem is that, when it comes to teasers, the concept of the "best" makes little sense at all, and even if it did make sense, it is impossible for a 7-point teaser combining two 5.5-point favorites to be "the best."   Based on a cost and benefit analysis, even a 6-point teaser with the same two 5.5-point favorites would be better. .

Defining the worst teaser of the year is quite simple. The worst teaser of the year is a teaser that has the highest vig, in which all teams in the teaser handicap to be the biggest losers to the teased spread that you will see all year. That is similar to the definition of the worst game of the year. Unlike the worst game of the year, however, which must always be the opposite side of the best game of the year, the best "Teaser of the Year" cannot be the opposite side of the worst teaser of the year.

Combining the teams that handicap to cover the teased line by the most points you will see all year would NOT be the best teaser of the year. Rather, it would rank as one of the worst teasers of the year, even though it might win. It would certainly rank as one of the dumbest bets of the year.

The two teams you believe will cover the spread by the most points all year are the two bets that are least likely to need to be teased to win.   Combining them might qualify as the best parlay you will see all year, but not the best teaser. Why lay 13-10 on a 7-point teaser, instead of getting 13-5 in a parlay, if you fully believe, in advance, that the two selections are the least likely to need to be teased of all the bets you will see all year?   Those are the worst two teams to tease all year, not the best. Teasing those two teams is like buying expensive tickets to a concert you know is free, and then calling it your best purchase of the year because you got the tickets at a big discount from the price printed on their face.

In both a parlay and a teaser you must win all games bet. A teaser is simply a parlay in which you are permitted to move the line on the teams in your favor by a designated number of points   Odds vary between bookmakers, but most commonly, to bet a 2-team, 6-point teaser you must lay 11-10, and to bet a 2-team, 7-point teaser you must lay 13-10. By contrast, a 2-team parlay pays 13-5..

If you make a $100 bet on a 6-pomt teaser combining the two teams you expect to cover the original spread by the most points of any two bets all year, and you are correct in your handicap, you will earn a $91 profit. If you are wrong, and one or both of the teams lose to the original spread by more than 6 points, you will lose $100.

If you make the same bet on a 7-point teaser, and, as you predict, the two teams win big over the original spread, you will win only $77 instead of $91. All you gain by accepting a $77 win in place of a $91 win is an extra one loser becoming a winner in the very rare event that one or more of your great best bets of the year might actually lose by EXACTLY 7 points to the original spread, and the rest of your teams cover the teased spread. If you are wrong in your game prediction, and one or both of your games loses by more than 7-points from the original spread, then you will lose the exact same $100 as with the 6-point teaser.

If, instead, you bet the same two teams in a $100 parlay, and your two best bets win big as predicted, you will make a profit of $260   That's almost 3x the $91 profit on a 6-point teaser, and more than 3x the $77 profit on a 7-point teaser.

As you can see, if you are right about your two great bets, all you accomplished by betting a teaser, instead of a parlay, is to win much less money. If you are wrong by more than 7-points on either team, then you will lose exactly the same $100 no matter whether you bet a 6-point teaser, a 7-point teaser or a parlay.

You will gain by betting a teaser over a parlay only when you are wrong about one or both of your best bets, but you are not wrong by more than 6 points. You will gain betting a 7-point teaser, instead of a 6-point teaser, only when you are wrong by exactly 7-points on at least one of your games. If you are wrong by more than 7-points you lose the same amount with both bets, and if you wrong by less than 7-points you would have won more by betting a 6-point teaser.

Thus, the best 6-point teaser you can possibly bet is not one in which both your teams handicap to cover the original spread big time. In that case, betting a teaser makes no sense. You should bet a parlay. The best 6-point teaser you will see is one in which both teams handicap, in advance, to lose to the original spread by 0-6 points.

The best possible 7-point teaser is one in which both of your teams handicap to lose to the spread by EXACTLY 7 points.

No matter what type of teaser you bet, for the teaser to be a good bet it must contain teams you expect to lose against the spread.

Obviously, the concept of a "Teaser of the Year" makes little sense.

Next, let's examine why teasing two 5.5 point favorites can NEVER be the best teaser a handicapper will see all year. In fact, teasing such favorites is one of the worst teaser bets you can make.

When you accept the much lesser payout of a teaser over a parlay, you are paying for the numbers that the bookmaker permits you to move across when you change the line.

When you tease a 5.5-point favorite by 6 points, the line on the favorite becomes +1/2. Since the advent of overtime in college football, the +1/2 point line you get in the 6-point tease of a 5.5-point favorite is worthless. Betting a favorite at pick'em is no different from betting the same favorite at +1/2 or -1/2. With all those lines, you will only win if the favorite wins by at least one point. If the favorite loses by 1 point you will lose with all three lines. Anytime you pay to buy 6 points, and your 6-points include the pick'em, you are really getting only 5 points for your money because the game won't end in a tie.

If you tease a 5.5-point favorite by 7 points, the line on the favorite becomes +1 1/2 points. You have now gained a win if the favorite loses by 1 point, but you are still crossing the pick'em line. Thus, even though you are paying more to get 7 points, your kindly bookmaker is only giving you 6 points. The 7-point teaser will save you only if the game ends with the favorite winning by 5 or 4 or 3 or 2 or 1, or with favorite losing by 1. Count them. That's only 6 numbers. A teaser crossing pick'em is a carton of eggs with one egg broken. You wouldn't call such a carton the best dozen eggs you expect to see in the supermarket all year, would you?

Whenever you cross the pick, the bookmaker is taking you for a sucker. He could give you the full 7-points he is charging for by adding a point at the end, but he doesn't. He assumes most bettors don't know the difference.

The supposed expert, whose "Teaser of the Year" inspired this article, used not one, but TWO 5.5 point favorites as his "Teaser of the Year.". That qualifies him as a big all-day sucker, and perhaps the "Rube of the Year." It doesn't matter whether it won or lost, his "Teaser of the Year" is definitely in the running for the worst "Teaser of the Year."

RULE #1: A teaser that crosses the pick'em line in football is the worst of all teasers you can bet because you are always paying for the benefit of more numbers than you are actually getting.

Finally, let's see why even a 6-point teaser on the same two teams would better than the 7-point teaser claimed to be the "Teaser of the Year." The 7-point teaser pays you 15.4% less profit when you win than a 6-poiont teaser. In this case, the handicapper is recommending that you give up 15.4% of your winnings to insure against the favorite losing the game straight-up by 1 point.

In football, not every final score is equally likely to occur. The favorite losing by 1 point is one of the least likely events in all football. The favorite loses the game by a single point just once in approximately 120 games.   Even if you handicap the favorite to lose by exactly one point, it is unlikely to happen. If you are correct in your handicap, the favorite is much more likely to lose by 3 or win by 3, than to lose by one. Look at the results for the past two Saturdays, November 21, and November 14, 2009. There were 132 college games on the board.

Question: Of the 132 college football games played on the past two Saturdays, how many do you think ended with the favorite losing by one point?

Answer: None.

Paying 15.4% of your winnings to tease a 5.5-point favorite by 7-points instead of just 6-points is like paying 15.4% of the value of your home to add flood insurance to the home-owners' policy on your house in Las Vegas. That would not exactly qualify as the best insurance purchase you will make all year.

To win laying 13-10 on a 7-point teaser you must win 56% of the teasers you bet. If you bet 120 teasers, to be a winner you must win at least 67 of them. If you bet each one as a 7-point teaser instead of a 6-point teaser, and risk $100 on each teaser, you will win just $77 instead of $91 on each of the 67 winners. Over the entire 120 teaser bets, you would win $938 less by betting 7-point teasers than if you bet the same teams as 6-point teasers. If all the teams you tease are 5.5-point favorites, you can expect just one of your120 teasers to be saved by the fact that you bet every teaser as a 7-pointer instead of a 6-pointer.   By changing one losing teaser into a winner you will gain $177 -- the $100 loss that is cancelled plus the $77 win that replaces it.

If you think that exchanging $938 for $177 is a great money-making idea, save yourself the effort of placing the 120 bets, and send your checks and money orders for $938 to Rob Crowne, c/o Pregame.com, Las Vegas, NV.   I'll wire $177 to your bank account as soon as your check clears, and I'll even pay for the wire.   For faster service, you can wire your $938 directly to my bank account and receive my $177 wire back the same day. Call for details. There is no limit on this offer. Feel free to do it as often you like.     .

Just for good measure, on Sunday, another handicapper at the same website recommended a 7-point teaser on the Giants -7 teased to Pick, combined with Green Bay -6.5 teased to +1/2. I guess this "expert" figured that there was an excellent chance that both the Giants and Green Bay games would end in a tie, and he wanted to make sure that he saved his clients in the event that should happen. What other reason could he have to recommend that his clients give away 15.4% of their winnings to buy that 7th point and get to the line of pick'em?

In most cases, when an advisor tells you to bet a teaser, he is really saying one of two things:

1. The teams he is giving you do not handicap to win, but rather to lose to the spread within the pointswindow created by the teaser; or more likely

2. He expects his picks to win, but his handicapping is so bad that you should pay for insurance to protect yourself from his mistakes.

If an advisor recommends you pay extra to tease to the pick line or to + or - 1/2, what he is really saying is:

1. That he has no clue what he is doing, but his handicapping is so bad he thinks a mere 6 points won't do when insuring against it; or equally likely

2. He knolws exactly what he is doing, and he has a financial interest that coincides with that of the bookmaker at which most of his clients are placing their bets.

Are you starting to understand how bookmakers pay for the fancy cars they drive?

Here are a few more rules for you:

RULE #2: No 7-point line move in college or pro American football will increase your win percentage sufficiently to make up for winning 51% less on a 2-team combination than you would if you bet a parlay.
RULE #3: There are very few 6-point line moves in college or pro American football that will increase your win percentage sufficiently to make up for getting 47% less on each 2-team teaser win than you would if you bet a parlay.

RULE #4: When combining two teams, a parlay is always a better bet than a 2-team, 7-point teaser.

RULE #5: When combining two teams, a parlay is a better bet than almost every 6-point teaser.

RULE #6: A parlay is a NOT a good bet unless correlated. It is merely a better bet than almost every teaser. An uncorrelated parlay is always a worse bet than a straight bet.

FINAL RULE: Betting parlays and teasers is a primary cause of sports-bettor losses. Despite what you may hear from the tout and bookmaking industries, as a general rule such bets should be avoided. The few circumstances that create exceptions to this rule have become very hard to find.

MORE LESSONS FROM THE HILTON CONTEST

Rob Crowne — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 16:38:00 GMT

At the beginning of October, I wrote an article titled, "Lessons from the Hilton Contest." I pointed out that keeping track of the Hiton NFL Contest provides an excellent lesson in short term vs. long term results.

There are, however, two more lessons that we can learn from examining the contest:

LESSON #1: Despite what you've heard, you can't win by betting against against the public because in terms of individual game win percentages the public will win more than they lose.. .

LESSON #2: The general public wins a higher percentage of their selections than the average sports service.

LESSON #3: Despite what you've heard from lawmakers and linemakers about the spread being the great equalizer, the football spread can be beaten.

At the time of my first article, the top selector had a record of 87%, and four contestants were tied for 2nd with 80% wins. There were 60 of the 329 contestants with a win-record of 67% or higher.

As predicted, those numbers have come down drastically. Just 4 weeks later, after 35 selections, the #1 conteatant no longer has an 87% record. The current top winning record is 26-9, 74%.

Far from there still being 60 contestants with a record over 67%, there are now a mere 7.   My prediction is that there will be no more than one contestant above 67% when the contest ends, and it is more likely that there will be no one above the 67% mark. Only 53 contestants out of 329 (16%) are now above 60%. A mere 141 (43%) are above the 52.5% needed to overcome the vig.

You are probably now asking yourselves exactly how those numbers teach the lessons stated above. To understand, we must look deeper into the numbers. Before we begin, we will need to make some assumptions.

Theorem #1: The 329 contestants in the Hilton Contest represent a cross-section of the general sports-betting public.

Theorem #2: To win by going against the public money, there must be more members of the general public below 50% than above it.

Theorem #3: If the spread equalizes each game and creates a 50-50 proposition, we should find 1/3 or more of the contestants in the Hilton Contest at 50% wins, and the balance of the contestants should be equally split above and below the 50% win line.

Since we are dealing with a pool of 329 separate bettors, we should find the above percentages over any period, long term or short term in number of games. That is true because the 329 separate bettors create their own long term result if we consider that there are 329 x 5 = 1645 separate game selections per week. At the end of the past 7 weeks there have been 11,515 selections against the spread. Thus, even though each individual contestant is still in the short term with only 35 selections, the macro percentages of wins and losses for the entire contest have now been determined over more than 11,500 selections, and can be considered to be long term.

Through the first seven weeks, there have been an odd number of selections (35) per contestant.   I considered any contestant with a record of 18-17 (51.5%) or 17-18 (48.5%) , or 17-17-1 to be at 50%. We expected to find 33% of all contestants (110 contestants) at the 50% wins to losses mark. Instead, there were just 74 contestants (23%) with a 48.5% to 51.5% record.

Even if the number of contestants at 50% wins is lower than expected, we still should find that the balance of contestants are equally split above and below 50%. Instead, there were 141(43%) with a record above 50%, and just 114 (35%) below 50%. The number of contestants with less than a 50% win record is only slightly higher than the expected 33%, but the number of contestants above 50% wins is significantly higher than expected. It is obvious that the 10% of contestants who are missing from the expectated number at 50% wins are almost entirely distributed above the 50% win line.

All of the 141 contestants above 51.5% had records over 52.5%, which is high enough to produce profits after vig.

Without calculating the exact win and loss numbers for all Hilton contestants, it cannot be known if, despite the macro win percentages of the general public as represented by the Hilton Contest, the vig would make the bookmakers net winners. But it can be stated with certainty that the bookmakers are not winning the expected 4.5% of all the money crossing the table, and they may be net losers on straight bets from the general public.

If we assume that, if there were no vig, the 114 contestants losing more than 50% balance would balance 114 of their brethren who won more than 50%.   There are, however, still 27 extra contestants, or 8.2% of the total contestants who are unbalanced winners. Whether or not their wins exceed the vig paid by all 329 contestants, it is clear that the extra winners would cut into the bookmaker profit from the vig.

We know we cannot win following the 74 people at 50% because we will lose the same vig whether we follow them or bet against them. The balance of the contestants, however, are net winners to the tune of 55% winners over 45% losers. That later record means that if your total losses each season are 4.5% or more of all the money you bet, you will do better by following the public.

Since the straight bets of the public will eat into the bookmaker's profits, going against the public will result in losses greater than the losses produced by a coin flip. Those additional losses will be in an amount exactly equal to the amount that the public is winning. Thus, one would be better off simply flipping a coin to make selections than betting against the public.

After 11,515 selections, it is very significant to find that winners exceed losers by 23.7%, and that winners constitute the 43% lion's share of all contestants, with losers being 35%, and those at the expected 50% being just 23% of all contestants.   Such results in a sample 11,515 selections are not likely to be random. It is proof that the spread can be beaten, and that it is being beaten by the general public.

Each year, when the Las Vegas sports books provide their profit numbers to the Gaming Commission and file them with the SEC, we find that the average winnings of all the sports books range from 3.9% to 4.7% of the money bet though the window. If the public can pick more winners than losers, and perhaps even beat the vig, the question arises as to how the bookmakers manage profits that are near the 4.5% vig. The answer lies in the way the public bets.

Not all bets carry a 4.5% vig. When the public buys a half point, they increase the vig from 4.5% to 8.3%. The value of that half point is often less than half the extra 3.8% vig paid. The average increase in value for the bookmaker from buying half points in football on numbers from 1-13, excluding the numbers 3 and 7 in which still more is charged, is just 2.1%. The net to the bookmaker averages an additional 1.7% of all the money bet.

When the public bets a 2-team parlay, the vig is a huge 10%. The vig on parlays with more teams is higher, and the vig on the popular parlay cards is higher still.

On a 2-team, 6-point teaser in the NFL, laying 11-10, the vig is a huge 47.5%. In football, the amount the bookmaker gives back with the 6-point line move depends on the numbers being purchased, and whether the teaser is in the NCAA or the NFL. Nevertheless, the value returned to the player can be as little as 7.5% when turning a favorite into an underdog by teasing across pick'em. The net profit to the bookmaker in such circumstance is 40% of all the money crossing the table.

With such large profits emanating from poor betting technique, the real question is not how the books make money, but why they don't make more than the average 4.3% that they report each year. The most reasonable answer is that the straight bettors, and those using advantage techniques, both public and wiseguy, eat up all the extra profits..

It is intersting to note that not only does the public do well, but they do better than the average sports service as measured by the records of The Sports Monitor of Oklahoma City. Last year, of the 218 sports services being tracked by the Sports Monitor, only 64 (29%) were above the 52.5% needed to win after subtracting the house take. That compares to 44% of the public currently above that percentage in the Hilton Contest. In fact, the Sports Monitor percentage of winners for the 2008 NFL Season is close to the random results we would expect to get if all contestants were flipping a coin, or if the spread caused game results to be strictly a matter of luck. .

It might be argued that the Sports Monitor results are full year, and therefore more long term and perhaps more representative than the seven week record in the Hilton Contest. That argument is probably spurious.

The Sports Monitor handicappers averaged only 72 selections each for the entire season. Several of the handicappers had 40 or fewer selections for the entire season. Based on the top 64 Sports Monitor handicappers, I extrapolated the total number of season selections at the Sports Monitor last year to be 15,700. A sample of 15,700, as compared to a sample of 11,500 in the Hilton Contest, is not a sufficient percentage difference to explain a 15% difference in the pool of winners between the two groups.   A statistical sample of 11,500 selections is more than sufficient to validly extrapolate that there will still be more winners than losers in the Hilton Contest when it reaches 15,700 selections.

If the spread makes sports selection a 50-50 proposition, or if the contestants were flipping a coin, then we would expect more and more people to get closer to 50% as the sample of games gets larger. If, on the other hand, the selectors are skilled handicappers and have an edge, the larger the sample the larger the percentage of winners will become and the smaller the percentage of losers will shrink. Thus, if the sample of the Sports Montior is larger and more representative, and we assume that the pool of handicappers are skilled, the Sports Monitor winning percentages should increase and become larger than the results in the Hilton Contest.

Further, any advnatage that may have been gained by the effect of luck on the smaller 11,500 sample in the Hilton Contest is balanced by the fact that the contestants at the Hilton must select 5 games each week, while the handicappers with Sports Monitor can pick and choose their spots, perhaps selecting only one game one week, and 6 games the next. The handicappers at Sports Monitor also have the aability to pick and choose their line based on the time of release of their play. The Hilton contestants must bet based on the fixed line set by the Hilton.

Sports Monitor handicappers are also given the huge advantage of an assumption of the best line when more than one line exists. That means that if a game is selected against a line that is either 3.5 or 4, all the handicappers who selected the underdog are given the line of +4 for the push, while all the handicappers who selected the favorite are given the line of -3.5 to log the win. Hilton Contestants have no such advantage.

Given the advantages of the Sports Monitor handicappers, we would expect to find the professional handicappers to have the same or a higher percentage of winners, and if they are skilled, the extra 4000 selections would create an even higher probability that the skill would show increasing the number of handicappers who are above 52.5%. The low comparative percentage of winners at the Sports Monitor is an indication of a skill level equivalent to flipping a coin.

It should be noted that the above conclusions are based on averages of all 218 handicappers submitting selections to Sports Monitor, and do not reflect the ability of any individual handicapper at Sports Monitor, who may be very skilled and far more skilled than the average Hilton contestant.

It should also be noted that the conclusions are based on the assumption tha the Hilton contestants represent a statitically valid cross-section of the sports betting public, and are not a pool of particularly skilled sports bettors..

To check the validity of our conclusions and extrapolations, I will review the numbers again when the Hilton Contestants reach 70 or 75 selections, as well as at the end of the Contest.

HOW TO STOP CHICKENS FROM HATCHING

Rob Crowne — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 22:13:00 GMT

Question: How do you stop a chicken from hatching?
Answer: Call Rob Crowne

You know the saying: "Don't count your chickens before they hatch."    Well, when it comes to hatching chickens, I'm a champ at stopping them.

Last night my Crowne Jewel was on Minnesota. I predicted Minnesota would win by 14. My point predictions are sufficiently accurate that I will often back them with my money. Last night, in the "Margin of Victory" proposition, I put my money on "Minnesota by 13-18 points," at odds of +600.

With about 4 minutes to go in the game, and the Vikings leading by 16, and Green Bay not having scored a single point in the second half, I made the fatal mistake of putting a little "W" in a circle next to the "Margin of Victory" bet.

Not satisfied with that mistake, I compounded the curse by happily multiplying my bet by 6, and writing the result down with a "+" in front of it. As soon as I did it, I knew I shouldn't have. I could hear the leaves rustle and a cold wind whistle past my window. But it was too late. Luckily for all of you who bet the Vikings, I caught myself before putting a "W" next to the Win Bet.

Just 20 seconds after I put my Margin of Victory "W" on the paper, Minnesota's defense inexplicably fell apart, and Green Bay scored a TD.

Did I say inexplicably? I can explain it. It was all my fault. I take full blame. I cursed the play by writing down the result before the game was over. It was a lapse. I know better.

For some reason, the curse never works the other way. Before the game is over, I can make a Christmas tree of little red "L's" in a circle next to every one of my teams that is failing to cover, and it NEVER reverses a single result and causes me to win. In the other direction, however, if I take the win before the game is over, I can be ahead by four touchdowns at the 2-minute warning and I will lose.

It actually happened to me once. I have intentionally managed to forget the teams involved. My team was covering by 27 points. There were 3 minutes to go and the opponent was about to punt to my team.   With just 3 minutes to go, a 27-point lead, and the ball, I wrote down the "W."

I hardly completed the last upleg of the "W" when my team fumbled the punt. The opponent recovered the fumble and ran it in for a TD. The opposition kicked off. Incredibly, the same thing happened again. My team fumbled, the opponent recovered and ran it in. Now, behind by only two scores, the opponent decided to go with an onside kick. It was successful, and three plays later they were in the end zone again.   Now I actually didn't want my team to receive the ball. I wanted them to waive the kickoff and just give possession to the other side at the 20. They'd given up three TD's in 90 seconds by receiving the ball.   My wishing didn't help.

Despite my fear, this time my team held onto the ball for a first down after the kick. But the gods were just having fun with me. Two downs later, my team was intercepted trying for a first down that would allow them to run out the clock. The other team scored just before the final seconds ticked off, covering the spread by one point.

Moral: Don't ever scramble fertilized eggs.

To celebrate the win on the Crowne Jewel and make-up for the loss on the smaller play on the total last night, tonight's CFB play is FREE. You can get it on the Free Pick Page by CLICKING HERE.

LESSONS FROM THE HILTON CONTEST

Rob Crowne — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 20:21:00 GMT

Keeping track of the Hilton NFL Contest can be an excellent lesson in short term vs. long term results. At the end of three weeks of NFL action, the top selector in the Hilton Contest stood at an excellent, and very lucky, 13-2 (87%). You don't expect him to be 69-11 at the end of the Contest, do you? The next four selectors were tied for 2nd place with a record of 12-3 (80%).

There are 60 contestants who stand at 67% winners after three weeks. That's approximately 1 in every 6 contestants. When the contest ends, each handicapper will have made 80 selections. It is unlikely anyone will be at 67% or more after 80 selections. It is so unusual for anyone to hit 67% in 80 selections that the Hilton offers a $10,000 bonus each year if any contestants finish at or above that percentage. Most years, a finish at 63-65% is sufficient to walk away with the top prize of approximately $300,000.

The reversion to realistic percentages has begun, as those who jumped on board the top selector as if they were jumping into a hot craps table unfortunately discovered this week. Not a single one of the top 5 selectors has had a winning week so far.

Parlayexperts.com, the top selector, is 0-4 this week, with Minnesota pending tonight.

Jasterpix.net (makes you wonder who took Jaxterpix.com) is 2-2 with Minnie pending.

Sean Lenahan is also 2-2 with Minnesota pending.

Ace/Jeff Smith (no relation to Ace/John Doe) is also 2-2, with (you guessed it!) pending.

The only contestant fully determined this week is RGS 2 with a record of 1-4.

That's a combined 7-14 (33%) so far, with only Minnesota to save a winning week for just two out of the 5 handicappers. If Minnesota wins the record for all 5 will still be a losing 11-14 (44%). If Minnesota continues this week's trend and loses, then the combined record will be a hideous 7-18 (28%), with all five of the top contestants being below 50% this week. and lowering the best possible record of all the top five contestants to 15-5 (75%). That's a mere 8 percentage points away from losing the bonus.

The favorite at home on Monday NIght combined with the Bret Favre hype has sent the line on Minnesota running from -3 up to -5 right now. According to Sportsbookspy an incredible 62% of all bettors are on Minnesota. Minnesota is so hot that the four sports writers analyzing the game in the Green Bay Press-Gazette, a publication normally biased toward Green Bay, picked the Vikings to cover the spread.

It is often observed that everyone being on one side of the game is the kiss of death for that side. Will Minnesota win and save face for at least two of the top selectors in the Hilton, or will this week's losing curse continue? . Is the public correct? Rob Crowne knows, and if you Click Here you'll know too. The side and total in tonight's game is up with an analysis, and one of the plays is a Crowne Jewel.

No matter which team wins tonight, the Hilton Contest is a lesson in why you should never jump on or off a a handicapper based on short term results, and why you shouldn't believe those guys who tell you they hit 69%+ every year..

OPPOSITE SIDES

Rob Crowne — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 18:00:00 GMT

Recently, there was a discussion in the Pregame forum regarding the suspected release of opposing sides in the same game by a handicapper. It turned out that there was nothing evil going on, but the attitude of some posters left no room for the possibility of a legitimate reason for opposite sides.

Most sports bettors treat the recommendation of opposite sides by a sports advisor as invariably evil. There are many times, however, when the release of opposite sides of the same game is completely legitimate.

Releasing opposite sides of the same game got its bad reputation from a con game run by fraudulent sports advisory services. These services would give half their customers one side of the game, while giving the other half the other side of the game on the same day at the same line. By so doing, they guaranteed that at least half their customers would be winners.

The above procedure was most often used in conjunction with a refund guarantee if the selection lost. By giving out opposite sides of the game, the tout is the only one who couldn't lose. He was always collecting fees from half his customers.

Sometimes, the tout might even offer up to 50% extra if the play lost. So long as the tout gave an equal number of customers each side of the game, the losers were refunded all of their own money plus a portion of the winners' money. The tout kept the rest by simply flipping a coin and making some phone calls.

The fact that the release of opposite sides can be used as a part of a fraud, however, does not mean that the practice can be labeled as evil without any examination of the circumstances.

Sports selection marketing sites, such as Pregame, automatically sell opposite sides every day as part of their release of plays from multiple handicappers. If one puts 20+ handicappers together, all handicapping independently, it would be very unusual for there to be no disagreement among them. All the handicappers can be winners over time and still there can be opposite opinions on one or more specific games every week.

Some sports advisors also market services from other advisors   So long as the other services being marketed are completely independent, these sports advisors may also legitimately market opposite opinions from the different handicappers and themselves.

You can avoid ever purchasing opposite side recommendations by simply following one handicapper at a time. If you do follow more than one handicapper, you must have a set and invariable selection method whenever there are conflicts.

When purchasing selections from more than one handicapper, you should either eliminate opposite recommendations from your betting, or devise some consistent method of choice between the handicappers. Whether you choose a selection method or eliminate the game, you should do so consistently. If you turn your method of dealing with opposite opinions into a guessing game, you will not be getting the full benefit of the edge to be obtained by following a skilled handicapper.

What definitely won't work if you purchase selections from multiple handicappers is the advice given several years ago by a Joe Atkins salesman to a bettor I know.   Joe's service also marketed the selections of a handicapper named Randy White. The salesman was attempting to sell the bettor both services.

"What should I do if Joe and Randy are on opposite sides?" the bettor queried.

"Bet both picks," came the reply from the salesman.

Releasing opposite sides can also result from the necessity of making early selections, combined with late changes in game fundamentals or movement of the line.

The earlier selections are made, the more unknowns there are, and the more things affecting the game that may change before game time

There are many reasons for releasing selections early:

Services that publish newsletters need to get those newsletters written, printed, and in the mail or to the news stand distributors by no later than Monday if the newsletter is to get to readers before the Thursday games.   The selections in the newsletter must, of necessity, be made over the preceding week, before the results and injuries of that week are fully known. It should not surprise anyone if selections in a newsletter are different from, and often opposite, the same handicapper's late phone service plays released on game day, when the handicapper has the prior week results, can examine the box scores from the prior week, has up-to-date injury information, and knows the weather.

The handicapper should, however, make the situation clear in both his newsletter and to his game-day selection clients. Further, the handicapper's advertised record should only be based on his final selection changes. If his final selection changed, the handicapper should not take credit in the newsletter for the winner. Unfortunately, few newsletter publishers function honestly in this regard.

Even sports advisors who do not publish newsletters may be required to release selections before all the necessary game information is available. Customers are often less interested in accurate selections than they are in convenience. For various reasons, many customers want to get their picks early in the week, or at worst, early on game day. Customer demand can cause the release of selections before all late game information is known. That may result in selection changes when the handicapper releases selections to late phone subscribers later.

Finally, one of the biggest reasons for betting or releasing opposite sides is line movement. Changing fundamentals will cause only about 10% of those line moves. The rest are caused by public betting patterns or by the big money betting syndicates. Some of the biggest and most extreme line moves are created by intentional line manipulation.
Line manipulation has been previously discussed in the articles Syndicate FAQ's #2, and Betting with the Smart Money.

If market manipulation is the aim, when the early bet is made, the intent is to bet on the opposite side later in the week. Services that release plays based on line movements, or based on the actions of known syndicate runners, may, very honestly, release opposite sides simply because the wise guy group itself has bet opposite sides.

Opposite sides may be intentionally released to the same people to capture middles. A few months ago I wrote a forum post about creating middles in series betting. Release of opposite sides is also common during my half-time reports. At the half of a game there is a wealth of information regarding game time decisions, mid-game injuries, the ability of players who are not 100%, and the general way that the teams are matching up and their game plans are working. Half time lines can also be significantly different from the game line. It is not unusual for the full game favorite to be an underdog in half time betting. All these factors result in frequent changing of sides during half time betting.

Playing opposite sides is an important part of smart money betting, and the release of opposite sides by a sports service when an opinion changes can be more honest than simply sticking to an opinion when the information and circumstances change. I'll discuss the signs that indicate possibly fraudulent opposite siding, the best ways to handle selections from multiple services in future articles.

HALL OF FAME GAME WINNING FACTS

Rob Crowne — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 22:09:00 GMT

Tonight, the NFL Preseason starts with the Hall of Fame Game between the Tennessee Titans and the Buffalo Bills. I got my start in the sports advisory business as the organizer of an information network. At no time, in any sport, is informaiton more important to winning than in the NFL Preseason. Here is all the important information you will need make a winning selection in the Hall of Fame Game.

Buffalo coach Dick Jauron treats the preseason with disdain as indicated by his 12-20 (37.5%) straight up win record in preseason play.

Tennessee coach Jeff Fisher is 29-25 straight up in the preseason.

Dick Juaron is on the hotseat after yet another losing season. The Bills have a rare opportunity to look good on National TV and impress disillusioned fans.

Over Jauron's past three years with Buffalo, the team is 3-0 in Game 1 and 7-0 as an underdog in Preseason games despite Jauron's overall poor preseason performance.

The QB rotation for Buffalo will be Trent Edwards and the starters for 1-2 series. Ryan Fitspatrick and Gibran Hamdan will split the time into the 4th quarter and then Matt Baker will finish up.

Despite all the hype, don't blink or you will miss WR Terrell Owens.

Our sources at practices in upstate New York report that the play of both Ryan Fitzpatrick and Gibran Hamdan has been nothing short of hideous.

The QB rotation for the Titans will be Kerry Collins for 1-2 series, followed by Vince Young for entire half, and then Patrick Ramsay.

Young was the starting QB last year before being injured. He has a small hope of getting his starting position back if Collins falters. He is also in a competiton with Ramsay, who can maintain his #2 position if Young doesn't play well coming off the injury. The three-way competition should keep all three QB's playing hard.

Tennessee started camp on July 31, six days later than Buffalo, and later than many teams that don't play for another week. The Titans have had only one practice in pads, and Jeff Fisher is following a plan of taking it easy in camp. That type of play has been used by other coaches before, and has never worked out well. The Titans may lack physical conditioning.

The temperature in Canton will be almost 90 degrees, and even though no player will be on the field for the entire game, conditioning may be a factor in the outcome.

Tennessee coach Jeff Fisher spent all day Friday with his team preparing a game plan spefically for Buffalo. Normally, in preseason, coaches plan only based on those things they want to look at or practice. Preparing a game plan spefically for an opponent is unusual, and indicates a strong desire to win the game.

It's a tough call. My analysis of the above information and my selection based on it is only $10 by CLICKING HERE.

OFFSHORE ACCT - THURS 8/27 LATE MLB PLAY IN REPLIES

Rob Crowne — Sat, 20 Jun 2009 22:30:00 GMT

Once upon a time, a long time ago, in the land of Las Vegas, far far away, when Pregame was just a fantasy in RJ's head (when you are surrounded by show girls all day, you fantasize about sports websites), there was something called the PLUS10 Club. Rumor has it the Plus10 still exists. Check it out.

Way back then I was given a free $50 account as a promotion by an offshore sports book. I was giving a free pick everyday to PLUS10 subscribers, and I decided to that I would see how much I could accumulate in that $50 account while everyone else played along with me in their own accounts. Once the account got above $300, it never again fell below that. At its highest point before I stopped contributing to PLUS10, it reached a little over $1100.

I've gotten another promotional account. This time it's $100, and I've decided to do it again. We'll set a goal of beating the 23x top we hit the last time. Since we're starting with $100, the proportional record would be $2300. To beat it we'll set a goal of $2400 before we take them money out with a hearty thank you to the book and buy the significant other something nice. Used to be you could buy a damn nice necklace or bracelet for that kind of money. Today, you can get a damn nice wallet to go inside her $6000 hand bag. Oh, well, it beats having him or her harp on you for betting the games.

Here are the rules:

I will post the pick and the exact amount to bet on it from bankroll in this blog thread everyday. This blog thread will continue until we either bust out or hit our $2400 goal.

Be sure to play exactly as I tell you. If for any reason I fail to tell you an amount to play, it will be assumed that the risk on the play was a standard 10% of bankroll until the bankroll doubles to $200 and after that it will be a standard 5% of bankroll until the bankroll gets to $1000, at which time it will become a standard 2% of bankroll. Remember those are the amounts assumed only in the absence of any other stated amount.

In money line sports, the standard amount will be the amount to be risked for the comeback at the odds. For example, if the assumed bet it $20 on a -150 favorite and it wins the win would be 20/150 = $13. The loss if the play loses would be a flat $20, NOT $20 x1.50.

If no play is up by one hour before the start of the first evening game that day, there probably will not be a play. I a play will come up late, I'll post an annouuncement no later than one hour before the first evening.

Finally, these will, in most instances be my plays. I will try to put them up early. Additional late information may come in on the game after the play is posted, or the Syndicate group whose plays I also use for Pregame subscribers may come in on the opposite side of the game after I post it here. For that reason, I cannot guarantee that the selections here wil always be one of my selections given to subscribers. The play may be elimnnated late, or on very rare occasions end up being opposite a play I give to subscribers based on late information or from the Syndicate.

Under all circumstances, however, the play as posted here will count toward the offshore account.

The balance in our offshore account is now $100. See the Replies for tonight's play.

Bet Like a Pro: LAKERS/ORLANDO HEDGE STRATEGY

Rob Crowne — Sun, 14 Jun 2009 22:42:00 GMT

For the two prior games at Orlando I have told subscribers that the predicted point differential is 4 to 5 pts. The first game ended regulation at a 4 point differential, and the second game ended regulation within just two baskets of the prediction. Tonight's prediction hasn't changed. With the line set at -3 1/2 the game isn't playable.

Many of you will be watching the game tonight, and want to have some action on it. For those people, there is a hedging strategy that will give you the best of the probabilities. Consider this strategy similar to an option spread or an option strangle strategy when investing in stocks.

Orlando has played better ball in the first half than in the second half of their games at Orlando. There are several reasons why this may be happening. The reason, however, is less important than the fact that it is happening.

Orlando knows it must win this game to stay alive. I expect them to come out playing on all cylinders tonight. If they fail to cover the 3 1/2 point spread, it is likely to be as a result of their play in the second half, rather than their play in the first half. Thus, I am proposing to start the strategy by playing on Orlando in the first half at -2.

As I said earlier, the Lakers are a toss up at the line for the game. Given they have a 50-50 chance of covering if my handicap is correct, I will hedge the first half and take advantage of the probability that the Magic will again play more poorly in the second half by taking the Lakers + 3 1/2 for the game.

Now for the halftime play. If Orlando is ahead by more than 2 at the half, the worst I can do for the night is breakeven. If, the Lakers have covered the first half, I will have lost my first half bet, but since the Lakers are ahead of the spread the probability is higher than 50% that the Lakers will cover the game, and I have the best of it for a push.

If the Lakers are ahead big at the half, I can sit back and relax in the knowledge that I have a high probability of simply pushing on the night.

The biggest downside of the bet will be that the Lakers win the first half, but fail to cover the game. I consider this event, based on my handicap, to be the least likely event. The result, however, will be a loss of 2 units.

If Orlando wins the first half and the Lakers cover the game, the win will be 2 units.

If anything else happens you will push.

The chance to lose 2 units handicaps to be the lowest probability of all the possibilities.

Before I go, one quick word on the points vs. money line tonight. The actual value of 3 ? points in the NBA is exactly -155. The money line tonight is set -155. If you bet the -155 money line, it is the equivalent of saving the vig, because the value of the 3 1/2 points plus the -110 vig you need to lay on the points is -157.5. If you like Orlando in the game, bet the Money Line up to -157. At -158 and above bet the points.

I'll do an article on calculating the point values in the NBA at another time.

ONE TRIPLE CROWN RACE TOO MANY

Rob Crowne — Mon, 08 Jun 2009 06:52:00 GMT

Almost every year that a horse has wins in the first two legs of the Triple Crown under its belt, and this year for Calvin Borel, a jockey with two Triple Crown wins under his belt, the Belmont Stakes became one Triple Crown race too many.

The same was true for us and our Belmont Package. The Belmont Stakes was just one Triple Crown race too many. Although many other racing service and free handicapper with the same selections would have proclaimed the day a big winner, we called it a loser. It was not the Wall Street Syndicate's selections that fell down. It was the recommended play on those selections that was to blame.

There are two equally important parts to horse race betting. The first is the selections. The second is the manner in which those selections are bet. In racing, as a result of the many ways a horse can be bet, 10 people with the exact same 1st, 2nd and 3rd choices in a race can have 10 different results.. If no instructions are given as to the proportional weight to be given to various types of bets, and the types of bets recommended, as well as to how to combine the horses in those types of bets, then one person can be a big loser while the next person is a big winner with the exact same selections.

Even the most experienced race bettors cannot determine the best way to combine the horses and the bsst type of bets to make if they don't know the comparative strength of the handicap. For example, let's say we have the #1 as the 1st choice, the #2 as the second choice, and the #3 as the third choice. Some of the ways the race may be bet are determined by the payouts, but some of the way the race is bet must be based on the comparative probabilities of the three horses.

If the #1 is a strong stick out, then it may pay only to play him as the key on top in exactas and triples. If all three horses are closely matched in strength, it may necessitate betting them in a box, and if the prices don't warrant that many combinations, then not to bet the exacta or triple at all. If the top two horses are closely matched, and the #3 pick is a much weaker choice, it would make sense to only box the top two choices in exactas, and play the #3 choice only for 3rd in the triples. The handicapper alone knows those comparative strengths, and if the handicapper does not tell the bettor those comparative strengths, even the experienced bettor will be at a loss to bet the race in the most advantageous manner.

For the inexperienced bettor, who is not familiar with the expected payouts on various types of bets for which payouts are not posted, such as triples, superfectas and prick-3's, it is impossible to determine the best type of bet without very specific instructions from the handicapper as to how to bet and how to combine the horses..

It is for that reason that, unlike many services, which merely throw several horses at you in a race and then claim the payout on any exotic or horse that happens to come in, without ever subtracting the investment needed to get that payout, we give clients:
1. An exact order of finish,
2. A proportional amount to bet that can be used as a strength rating, and
3. The way we suggest the race can be most advantageously bet as to the types of bets and the horse combinations within those bets to achieve a long term favorable result.
We lose some big hits that way, but we also lose many fewer bets, we don't have bets that win but lose money after you subtract the investment, and we don't get buried by the huge vig in racing. In the long term we are better off.   We also always report results to clients after subtracting their investment and all losses on recommended bets. Finally, if we didn't recommend it, we don't claim to have won it.

The reason that so many other professional race handicappers don't do things the way I just described is tht it locks in their results. Sports betting is like shooting pigs in a pen compared to horse racing. Without using various tricks in reporting results, the majority of paid and free handicappers would never appear to be winners. Only a tiny number of people or groups can consistently beat the huge vig in racing and win.

On Belmont Day this past Saturday, we began the day with a loss in the first race, we passed the second race, and our first choice in the 3rd, a long shot named Ricoriatoa placed. We told clients to play 10 Win, 20 Place and 20 show. Ricoriatoa paid 9.20 to place and 6.30 to show. After subtracting our investment on the across the board and the investment on all recommended exotics as well as the loss in the 1st race, we were plus $37.

The Syndicate had one horse picked in the 4th Race. I gave it to Crowne Club members. Then, between updating the Club phone lines and updating the Pregame Race Package phone line, a call came in cancelling the horse. That happens every once in awhile. It could be something their experts saw in the paddock. It was too late to cancel to Crowne Club members. Once the play goes up, I must count it because some people got it. I had not yet updated the Pregame lines, however, and I was able to pass the race on a late update to them. If the horse won I would have counted the win for Crowne Club Members, but not for Pregame clients. The horse lost. I counted the loss for Crowne Club members but not for Pregame clients who never got the horse.   The across the board bet recommended to Crowne Club members totaled $50. Thus, for the rest of the day, Crowne Club member results would be $50 less than Pregame Package purchasers. We'll continue the results based on Pregame.

We lost the 5th and had the winner of the 6th. The winner paid a small $3.80, and after subtracting the $20 win bet, the two recommended $10 exactas and the $4 of Triple combiunations, we netted a tiny $6 loss on the race.

After all the wins were added, and losses and investment amounts subtracted, Pregame clients were down $177 going into the Belmont Stakes.

Now here's the difference between us and so many other professional race handicappers.   In the Belmont, the Syndicate had four horses, the 6-7-2-4. All four horses finished in the top four positions in the race. The exacta came in 4-2 paying $121. The Triple 4-2-7 paid $295. The Superfects 4-2-7-6 paid $852. That's more than enough to have made it a BIG winning day for us. The 4- horse box exacta would have cost $24, the 4 horse triple box would have cost $48, and the 4-horse superfecta box would have cost $48. The payout was $1268. After the cost, the win is $1148.

Most paid race handicappers, and most free handicappers would have taken that $1148 win. We didn't. We counted ourselves as losing $80 on the race. Why? Because unlike those other guys, we don't call ourselves winners after we see the results of the race, and whether or not we recommended that you make the bet. We also tell you exactly how to combine the horses. If the exact combinations we give don't win, we don't call ourselves winners.

We did not tell anyone to put the #4 on top in any of our exacta, triple, or superfecta combinations. As I said in a my article "Belmont Bets to Avoid," the triples and superfectas at Belmont have a huge takout. If you simply box them willy nilly, you may get a big hit like in the Belmont Stakes on Belmont Day, but you will end up buried long term. They must be bet judiciously. We did just that, and we counted ourselves losers on the race even though we had the correct four finishers in the race. Sure, some clients boxed the four horses. Congratulations to them. We didn't have the horses bet that way.   We consider our betting recommendations as to proportional amounts, types of bets and combinations to be as important a part of what clients get as the selections.

We passed the 12th, and our horse picked on top in the 13th came in 2nd, paying $6.20 and $4.80. We bet it $10 Win, $20 Place, $20 Show. After subtracting the total bet of $50 and a 2-horse $10 exacta box which lost, we netted $40 on the race.

We ended the day losing $217. We size our bets based on someone who normally bets $100 per game on a sporting event. That's a little over a 2-unit loss on a day when other racing services and tout sheets would have proclaimed a $931 win with the exact same picks.

We had just one Triple Crown race too many this year. We won't be back until the Breeders' Cup.

BELMONT DAY BETS TO AVOID

Rob Crowne — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 13:55:00 GMT

Triple bets are sometimes also called Trifecta bets. The bet requires that you correctly pick the first three finishers in the race in exact order. The track takeout on exotic bets, such as Triples, is huge. Depending on the track, the house cut of the betting pool ranges from 20%-35%.

Imagine if your poker game cut each pot by that much. It would change your betting style completely. The track take out is listed in the Daily Racing Form for each track, and usually at the track website. You can also call the indiviudual track to ask.

If the track takes out 30% or more, I advise that you stay away from betting the big takeout exotics completely. No matter what you do, you will almost never win a high enough percentage to overcome oa 30%+ track rake. Takeouts between 25% and 29% are borderline. You can still win, but you need to be very careful and selective in what you bet, and you need to make as few bets as possible. The more combinations you bet, the more a big takeout will hurt you.

The Belmont Stakes is coming up this Saturday. Belmont takes out a comparatively low 18.5% on Daily Doubles, Exactas, and Quinellas, and just 16% on the Pick-6 on days when there is no carryover. The takeout takes a giant leap up to 26%, however, on Triples, Pick-3's, Pick-4's, Superfectas, Grand Slams, and the Pick-6 on Days when there is a carryover.

Thus, in general, at Belmont this Saturday the exotics involving three or more horses in the result should be avoided, or played very carefully and only in the surest situations with a minimum number of comhinations.

Quinellas vs. Exactas

One more type of bet for you to avoid if you can't check comparative prices near game time is an exacta box in any race in which there is a quinella.

An exacta requires that you pick the first two finishers in the race in their exact order. When you box an exacta, you get all the possible exactas combining those horses. For example, if you bet a 1-2 exacta, the #1 horse must finish 1st and the #2 must finsih 2nd. If you bet a 1-2 exacta box, you are betting both the 1-2 exacta and the 2-1 exacta. You will win one of the exactas if the #1 and #2 horses finish 1st and 2nd in any order.

A quinella requires that you pick the first two finishers in the race in ANY ORDER. It is single bet covering both exactas in the exacta box. Since it covers both of two bets, it should, in theory, pay exactly half of the exacta amount AFTER deducting the losing exacta in the box from the win. Approximately 75% of the time, however, the quinella will pay more than half. The reason is that the quinella always includes the probability of the higher odds horse of the duo winning, and the lower odds horse will beat the higher odds horse better than 50% of the time.

There should be a quinella and an exacta in the 2nd and 4th races. If you bet a $2 exacta box, since there are two exactas involved, the cost would be $4. Simply bet the quinella for twive as much as you would bet each eacta. You get the same effect -- the #1 and #2 must finish 1st and 2nd in the race in any order, and both the $2 exacta box and the $4 quinella will cost you just $4. You will, however, win more money with the double bet quinella most of the time.

RULE: If you can't check the actual track payouts, you should always make a double bet on the quinella instead of a single amount bet on an exacta box.

As part of my Belmont Day Package, in addition to the Wall Street Syndicate's horse selections in the order they like them in every race they play, I give complete betting advice. I calculate for you when it pays to bet the exotics and which exotics and how to combine the horses. We are coming off a huge winning day on Preakness Day. It was so big that some thought it wasn't possible. You can get the Belmont Package HERE.

CAN YOU BE FOOLED? Part 2: Signs and Tells

Rob Crowne — Fri, 29 May 2009 00:28:00 GMT

In the first article in this series, we discussed the fact that the standard ways you make judgments about people cannot be used to spot con artists. The good con man is a person that most people trust implicitly, and who can charm the pants off you.

Con games don't only exist in the financial industry, or in the sports service industry. Con games are not used only to take your money under false pretenses. You have to be vigilant in all areas of your life. Politicians use con games to get elected. Our leaders use con games to curry favor for some project or bill. Con games can be used by anyone trying to misrepresent facts for any reason. They may even be used by your neighbor to turn you against some other neighbor. Wherever anyone in your life seeks to misrepresent facts, you will find one of the con game techniques we will be discussing in future articles.

To begin our discussion about recognizing con men, let's take a look at the well-publicized warning signs of the Madoff scam. The following tells were used by those who refused to invest with Madoff, as well as those who tried to report him. Many of them are the same type of tells that exist in any con game:

1. The Free Service that Makes No Sense. Bernie was giving away his hedge fund services for free. Other hedge funds charge as much as 2% of assets and 20% of profits, but not good old Bernie. Bernie wowed them and gained people's adoration by charging nothing while others charged hundreds of millions. Very few people in this world are great altruists, willing to provide endless time and resources for no return. How many of you out there work for free at whatever you do? If you work for a charity, it is probably one more deserving than making rich people richer or helping strangers beat their bookmakers. Giving something away for free under circumstances in which providing free services makes no sense, and the motivation cannot be seen, is often the sign of a con game. It is similar to an offer that is too good to be true, and probably isn't. In the Bernie Madoff con game, Bernie's failure to charge for his services made no sense. It was too good to be true, and hid a sinister motive. .

2. Hiding in Plain Sight Combined with Gaps in Information. Bernie supposedly made money by processing his hedge fund trades only through his own brokerage firm. That sleight of hand made a large part of what was going on, or in Bernie's case not going on, invisible to anyone but Bernie. The records of every brokerage firm are audited every year by the FINRA (formerly the NASD). They are the equivalent of being in plain sight. People relax their vigilance when things are in plain sight. They think that no con can take place because it will be noticed. When things are in plain sight from the start, it is easier to con people because they are less likely to examine what they are seeing. Hiding in plain sight makes the con easier, but it is not a sign of a con unless it is accompanied by the next tell on the list. That is, Gaps in Information. Gaps in information, or lack of detail, are an immediate danger sign. Madoff sent out detailed account statements, but he never sent any lists of securities owned by the hedge fund, or lists of transactions actually made by the hedge fund. These things would, he claimed, disclose his proprietary system that allowed him to make such great returns. Watch for missing information or detail under circumstances where it should exist, even if that information seems to be in plain sight.

3. Secrecy. Bernie would never reveal how, exactly, he was achieving the supposed gains he was paying to people. Experts sat down and tried for years to duplicate it. They couldn't. I've called sports services that refuse to provide any information about their handicapping methodology. About 15 years ago I started writing a book about sports services. I never completed it because services were appearing and disappearing faster than I could write. During my research on the book, I called sports services to find out their handicapping methodology. Some expounded on it for an hour. Some, however, refused to tell me anything. Their methods were supposedly secret. They wouldn't even tell me general things, such as "we use trends," or "we have proprietary systems," or "we analyze team performance statistics." I suspect their method was the "pin in the newspaper" approach, or the "off-the- top-my-head" opinion system. Secrecy can be another danger sign.

4. False auditors. Bernie's hedge fund was one of the biggest. Because Bernie was so nice, and so trusted, he had amassed an amazing $500 billion in money under management. Despite the size if the fund, however, Bernie was using a one-man auditing firm in upstate New York. It made no sense that a one-man accounting firm could possibly ever accurately audit an operation the size of Bernie's.

In these articles we will give examples of con games used for various purposes, but since this is a sports information forum, the main emphasis of our discussion of techniques and of our examples will be the misrepresentation of records by those who pick games, whether for free or paid. Not all of the signs and tells in the Madoff case are applicable to sports advisory situations, and there are additional signs and tells that may be applicable to sports advisors that are not applicable to Madoff.

We'll discuss some of the main signs one-by-one. Others we will point out as we explain the individual tricks themselves. In the next article we'll discuss in detail the free lunch and hiding in plain sight.

CAN YOU BE FOOLED? Part 1: Con Men

Rob Crowne — Wed, 27 May 2009 21:03:00 GMT

Do you know how to spot a con man? If you can't, the money he loses may be your own.

You cannot tell whether or not someone is a con man by using your great judgment of human nature. If a con man is good, he will have the ability to get most people to like him. The best salesmen sell themselves first, and the best con men will charm you right off your feet. Con men need your trust, and they know that the average person will trust people they like, and distrust people they don't like. A con man who is not likable is not a very good con man.

A con man will not necessarily look and act like a traveling carnie. A good con man must not only be likable, but people must trust him implicitly. The tout screaming like a carnival barker on his complimentary selection phone may be a con man, but if he is, he is not a very good one. Those who can be spotted instantly as con men are poor con men. The best con men are the ones that you cannot easily recognize. .

Bernie Madoff is the consummate con man. Everybody trusted him. People didn't just like him, they adored him. When he met you, he had the ability to disarm you completely. He was so good, even the regulatory agencies that audited him every year were mesmerized. Like any good magician, one of the key skills of a good con man is to charm people sufficiently that they don't look very carefully. Bernie was so trustworthy that hedge fund managers whose job it is to do what is called "due diligence" by investigating investments, and two government regulatory agencies, never looked.

Being difficult to spot, however, is not the same as being impossible to spot. As that famous carnie, PT Barnum, said, "You can't fool all of the people all of the time." There are ways to spot a con man, no matter how good he may be. For your financial well being, you need to become one of those people who can't be fooled. That doesn't mean you should be like those women in colonial Salem who ran around pointing their fingers and screaming, "witch," at everyone. Those who do that will cost themselves as much in lost opportunity as the person who trusts everybody loses by trusting the wrong people. You need to learn how to recognize a con and a con man when you see one, and to recognize honesty and sincerity when you see it. . .

The job ahead will be difficult. The difficulty in teaching people to recognize a con man doesn't lie in imparting the knowledge. The greatest difficulty lies in getting people to listen. No one likes to think that they can be fooled, or to admit that they have been fooled. If Bernie Madoff hadn't confessed to running a Ponzie scheme, he would still be operating it. If some outside agency came in and accused Bernie, there would be people outraged at the agency for besmirching the reputation of that wonderful Bernie Madoff. There were several people who notified the SEC. One guy made getting Bernie his life's work. He cited chapter and verse to the regulators. The SEC ignored him. Why? Because, like anyone else, the government investigators hate to admit they've been fooled.

Remember the special done on sports service scams by Bryant Gumble on HBO? They interviewed an actual client of Jack Price. They showed this client everything they found out about Jack Price's sports service. None of that mattered. The guy insisted that Jack Price could pick a winner whenever he chose, and had inside information about the games The client believed that the only reason he lost with Jack's picks was because he didn't pay enough and Jack didn't want to give him the right information. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, this client insisted that all he had to do was get enough money together to pay Jack in order to get the "real" information.

Other people seem to want to be fooled. Someone phoned me a few years ago inquiring about Crowne Club membership. When he came on board, I told him that once he was a member, he would get everything that I put out. He replied, "I know you guys get special information, I just want you to know if you get anything, I'm willing to pay whatever it costs for it." The guy was actually asking to be conned. Some people in this business would call me crazy, but I reiterated that if I ever got any "special" information he would get it as part of the Club, and there would no extra charge. "Okay," he said, "I just wanted you to know."

When his month was up and it came time for him to renew, he called to say he wasn't renewing because I never "gave him a shot" at my "special" games. I tried to explain to him the "special game" con. He didn't care. He hung up and did not renew because I hadn't conned him.

Finally, there are those who know they are being scammed, but will fight for the scam to continue because, although the game is dishonest, it is "the only game in town."

People love to believe in magic, and they hate the person who tells them there is no tooth fairy. As I expose the various scams, many of you will look around and suddenly realize you have been fooled. Many will want to go into denial. Try to keep an open mind. If you don't, as I said at the start, the money the con man loses may be your own.

In subsequent articles we will discuss the signs and tells that will allow you to spot a con, and we will expose the tricks of the trade and how they work.

A DAY AT THE RACES

Rob Crowne — Sun, 17 May 2009 15:12:00 GMT

What a day it was! A terrific day! A GIANT day! It was the kind of day most people have never had in their lives in horse racing. It was the kind of day the Wall Street Syndicate has produced for us many times in the past, and hopefully will produce many times again in the future.

The first race post time at Pimlico on Preakness Saturday was a ridiculous 10:15 AM Eastern time, and 7:15 AM for those in Las Vegas and west. If you got up late, you were lucky. On Derby Day, the Syndicate won right off the bat in the 1st race, but on Preakness Day the 1st race was one of only three races in which they lost. In the 1st race, we recommended a mere $10 to win on their weak top pick, a $4 exacta box on their top three choices, and a $2 Triple box on the same three choices. Total loss -$46. IF you woke up late, you got lucky because there was very little losing after that.

In the second race we recommended $50 to win and $100 to place on the #1, which looked like it might be a big favorite. We instructed everyone that the Syndicate wanted at least 1-2 on the horse and that if it was 2-5 or less 10 minutes before post it was a no play. I wasn't able to watch the odds of the second race, so I don't know if the odds were at 2-5 ten minutes before post or not, and I don't know if subscribers bet it or not. If subscribers did bet the horse, it won paying 2.80 and 2.20. That's a $30 pick up, which would have made up for most of the loss on the 1st race, but, even though the horse won, I made the assumption that no one bet it and I didn't count the win. Nevertheless, the fact remains it was a winning pick.

We passed the third race, and most people had awoken by the time the 4th race rolled around. In the 4th race, we had a $40 win bet on the top choice, a $5 exacta box on the top three choices, and a $2 Triple box on those top three choices. The top pick finished in a dead heat for second with the Syndicate's 3rd place pick. It was a lucky loss. The horse that won was the Syndicate's 2nd choice. It paid $28.80. The dead heat set up two exactas and two triples. We won both exactas in our 3-horse exacta box, and both triples in our 3-horse triple box. The second place horse finishing first raised the payout on our exactas and triples by much more than the $40 we lost when the top choice didn't win.
In all, for the 4th race, the exacta combining our the 2nd choice with our 3rd choice paid $73, and the exacta that combined our 2nd choice with our 1st choice paid $47.80. That adds up to a combined $120.80 comeback for every $12 box. Since we recommended a $5 exacta box totaling a $30 risk, our return was 2.5 x $120.80 = $302. The profit for our $30 bet was $272. But we weren't done. The two triples in our $12 triple box added up to a $322.40 return. Our profit was $310.40 on the triples. In total on the race we made $272 + $310.40 -$40 for a tidy $542.40 net profit on the 4th race.

By that time, everyone was probably hungry, and the win was enough for breakfast at Tiffany's, complete with Holly Golightly for company. To that point our total on the day, not counting the 2nd race win, was $496.40.

For the rest of the day we would be playing with the house's money. We would need to lose every other bet for the day to break even. If we won anything else at all, we would be guaranteed to be winners. We won plenty else!

On to the 5th race. This race was the second race of the total of just four races out of 10 in which we lost money. Our $10 Daily Double for the 4th and 5th went down, as did our recommended $10 to win and $20 to place on what was the Syndicate's single choice in the 5th. Subtract $40 from our total. That gave us $456.40.

The losing didn't last very long, however. In the 6th Race the Syndicate had only one horse picked again, Sumacha'hot. Anyone who can properly pronounce that horse's name will get a $10 discount coupon for my Belmont Day package. Here's a hint. The apostrophe is not a typo. It represents a glottal stop. Just one word of warning, if you are not a Klingon, don't risk your throat health even trying to properly pronounce the name. I gave the horse out to subscribers by number only, and it won paying $7.00 and $4.80. We had recommended $20 to win and $20 to place on the horse. Our return for our $40 bet was $118, and a net profit of $78 on the race. That brought our win total back up to $534.40.

Then, in the 7th race, our top choice finished second again, and just as before, it was a lucky second. The Syndicate's second choice won again. It was the #7 horse, again. It paid $20.20, and the $2 exacta paid $67.80. We had invested $24 in exactas and collected $135.60. The net win, after subtracting the $24 bet, was $111.60. But better yet, we had all the Syndicate's choices in the 7th tied up in Daily Doubles with their lone pick in the 6th, which had won. The $2 Daily Double paid a huge $112.60. We collected $225.20 for our total of $22 bet on the doubles, and we netted yet another huge profit of $203.20. The total win on the 7th race was $111.60 + $203.20. But wait! We also won the Triple AGAIN! The triple paid $284.60. We only recommended a $1 box, however. Stupid, gutless us. So we collected half the payout, which amounted to $142.30. After subtracting our total investment in the triple we had an additional profit of $130.30. That brought the total profit on the race up to $457.10 minus the $20 we lost on the win bet.

Add the $437.10 net on the 7th race to the $534.40 we had won for the day to that point, and our profit ballooned to +$971.50 for the day.

The Syndicate passed the 8th and 9th races, so we suggested that everyone take a 2-hour lunch break. Off we went to the steakhouse for a fancy winner's lunch. We came back at 4:00 PM Eastern for the 10th Race selections.

In the 10th race, the Syndicate's top pick won again, paying $5.40 this time. We had recommended a $20 win bet and collected $54. We had a $4 three-horse exacta box and $1 three-horse triple box on the Syndicate's top three choices in the race. The three 10th race selections came in 1st, 3rd and 4th, when Silver Edition got in between them for 2nd. Take Silver Edition out of the race, and we would have hit another exacta and triple. Close, but no cigar. Our total risk on the race was $50 and our return was $54 for a tiny $4 profit, but still a profit. Total profit for the day was now $975.50.

In the 11th race, the Syndicate produced their 3rd losing race of the day. We lost $16 in doubles between the 10th & 11th, a $10 win bet, a $20 place bet, a $4 exacta box, as well as a $1 triple box. The total loss on the race was -$76 and it brought our win down to $899.50   Boo hoo. That was by far our worst loss on the day, but more winning was to come.

In the Preakness, the Syndicate came back again on Musket Man. You thought maybe, after making him their sole pick in the Derby, they'd give up on him despite watching him close like a shot, just missing 2nd after a world of trouble in the race? We played $10 Win, $10 Place and $20 Show on Musket Man, and an additional $15 in exactas. No triples. Musket Man came in 3rd to two horses that were simply better than he was yesterday. No excuses. He paid $5.00 to show and a return of $50 for our $20 show bet. We had invested $55 in total in the race and the net loss was a baby -$5.

Our total was $894.50 going into the lucky 13th race. The Syndicate had only one pick again in the 13th and they won again to close out the day. The horse paid $5.00, and we picked up just enough to bring us back over the $900 mark at $909.50 profit for the day, less the cost of our fancy winner's lunch of course.

Our recommended bet amounts were based on what we believe to be proper money management for someone who normally bets $100 per game on sporting events. We invested LESS than $100 in every race except the 2nd race, which I didn't count even though the horse won.

When the smoke cleared, the Syndicate had selections in 10 races, just like last year on Preakness Day. We made a profit in 6 of the 10 races in which they had selections. Our highest loss on a race was -$76. Our highest win on a race was $532.40. The six winning races made a total profit of $1106.50. The four losing races lost a combined -$167 (the $30 difference from the net win above is attributable to the $30 in the second race which wasn't counted in the official total).   Their top choice won in 4 of the 10 races. That's one less winner than in last year's 10 picks. In addition to the four wins, their top choice horses also produced two seconds and a third. That's 70% in the money. Not as good as their 100% in the money on Derby Day, but no one can be 100% all the time.

On the way, we played exactas in 4 races and won 50% of them, which beats the Syndicate's 33% win percentage on exacta races in last year's Preakness. We also bet triples in 4 races and won 50% of those. We only won 1 out of the 4 (25%) of the Daily Doubles we bet, but when two of those doubles consisted of just one comhination of horses (one horse in each race), and one consisted of just 2 combinations, and the third consisted of 4 combinations (one horse in one race with 4 in the next) and the payout on the winning double was 55-1, a 25% win rate is more than high enough. If fact, with odds of 55-1 you could hit just 2%, lose 98%, and still be a winner. Winning 1 out of 8 double combinations, we hit the doubles at a 6 times higher percentage than we needed in order to be winners.

If you normally bet more than $100 per game adjust what your win would have been accordingly. If you bet less than $100 per game normally, you need to go back and recalculate. You can't just divide because you can't reduce the exotics below $1 and therefore, for example you would have picked up half the $100 player's win on the triple, and not a mere 1/4 of it in the 4th race, and you would have gotten the same $142.30 along with the $100 players on that $1 triple, and not 1/4 of it, so your total win should be higher than 1/2 the total for a $50 bettor and also higher than 1/4 for a $25 bettor. No matter how much you play, it was well worth the mere $49 cost of the selections.

Racing selections from the Wall Street crew will be back on Belmont Day. If you missed the Preakness, don't miss the Belmont. If you were on with us for the Preakness, I know you'll be back. Keep watching my pick page for the package.